Introduction
In 1963, Abraham Robinson applied his newly discovered nonstandard analysis to formal firstorder languages and developed a nonstandard logic [9] relative to the "truth" concept and structures. Since that time not a great deal of fundamental research has been attempted in this specific area with one notable exception [2] . However, when results from this discipline are utilized they have yielded some highly significant and important developments such as those obtained by Henson [3] .
The major purpose for this present investigation is to institute formally a more general study than previously pursued. In particular, we study nonstandard logics relative to consequence operators [1] [5] [10] [11] defined on a nonstandard language. Since the languages considered are not obtained by the usual constructive methods, then this will necessitate the construction of an entirely new foundation distinctly different from Robinson's basic embedding techniques. Some very basic results of this research were very briefly announced in a previous report [5] .
In 2, we give the basic definitions, notations and certain new standard results are obtained that indicate the unusual behavior of the algebra of all consequence operators defined on a set. In 3, some new standard properties relative to subalgebras and chains in the set of all consequence operators are investigated. Finally, the entire last section is devoted to the foundations of the theory of nonstandard consequence operators defined on a nonstandard language.
Basic concepts
Our notations and definition for the standard theory of consequence operators are taken from references [1] [5][10] [11] , and we now recall the most pertinent of these. Let L be any nonempty set that is often called a ( sentential) language), P(L) denote the power set of L and for any set X let F (X) denote the finite power set of X (i.e. the set of all finite subsets of X.) DEFINITION 2.1 A mapping C: P(L) → P(L) is a consequence operator (or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L) (i) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L and if (ii) X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y).
A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finite (finitary, or algebraic) if it satisfies (iii) C(X) = ∪{C(A) | A ∈ F(X)}. REMARK 2. 2 The above axioms (i) (ii) (iii) are not independent. Indeed, (i)(iii) imply (ii).
Throughout this entire article the symbol "C" with or without subscripts or with or without symbols juxtapositioned to the right will always denote a consequence operator. The only other symbols that will denote consequence operators are "I" and "U". The symbol C [resp. C f ] denotes the set of all consequence operators [resp. finite consequence operators] defined on P(L). (ii) Let U: P(L) → P(L) be defined as follows: for each X ∈ P(L), U(X) = L. (iii) For each C 1 , C 2 ∈ C, define C 1 ≤ C 2 iff C 1 (X) ⊂ C 2 (X) for each X ∈ P(L). (Note that ≤ is obviously a partial order defined on C.) (iv) For each C 1 , C 2 ∈ C, define C 1 ∨C 2 : P(L) → P(L) as follows: for each X ∈ P(L),
Prior to defining certain special consequence operators notice that I, U ∈ C f and that I [resp. U] is a lower [resp. upper] unit for the algebras C, ≤ and C f , ≤ .
PROOF. Let X, Y, A ∈ P(L) and consider C(X, Y). If A∩Y = ∅, then C(X, Y)(A) = A∪X ⊃ A.
Otherwise, A ⊂ Y and there exists some z ∈ A such that z ∈ Y. In which case, Y ⊂ {x, z} and, hence,
This results and axiom (ii) imply that axiom (iii) holds. This completes the proof.
Recall that C ∈ C is axiomless if C(∅) = ∅ and axiomatic otherwise [6] . Note that for any X, Y ∈ P(L), C(X, Y) is axiomless, and if X = ∅ or Y = ∅, then C ′ (X, Y) is axiomless. Recall that a member C 1 in the algebra C, ≤ covers C 2 ∈ C, if C 2 < C 1 and there does not exist some C 3 
Recall that C ∈ C is an atom if C covers I and C, ≤, I is atomic with E ⊂ C the set of atoms if each member of E covers I and for each I = C ∈ C there is some
and that each member of E 0 is axiomless if L has more than one member. The next result shows that C, ≤ is almost atomic. THEOREM 2.7. For C, ≤ , the set all axiomatic consequence operators C A covers E 0 and each member of E 0 is a atom.
PROOF. We first show that each member of E 0 is an atom. Let x ∈ L and assume that there exists some C 1 ∈ C such that C It is not difficult to show that C, ≤ [11] and C f , ≤ are both closed under ∧, where ∧ is (v) of definition 2.3, which, obviously, would be the meet operator associated with ≤ . However, as will be shown by a simple example, it is rare that these algebras are closed under ∨, which if either is so closed, then ∨ would be the join operator. Wójcicki was the first to recognize that not only are these algebras closed under ∨ w , and ∨ w is the join operator, but C, ∧, ∨ w , I, U is also complete [11, p. 276] . Unfortunately, C f , ∧, ∨ w , I, U is not complete [1, p. 180] . For a simple proof that C, ∧, I, U is meet-complete (and thus complete) see [11, p. 276 ]. Using the fact that C, ≤ is a meet semi-lattice, it follows easily that C f , ≤ is also a meet semi-lattice. We need only show that, for C f , ≤ , ∧ satisfies axiom (iii). Let C 1 ,
Certain subsets of C, ≤ and C f , ≤ may be closed under ∨, but, in general, there are members such that the ∨ operator does not yield a consequence operator. Let L have 3 or more members. Define S:
Observe that if L is a standard formal propositional or predicate language and S ′ the propositional or predicate consequence operator respectively, then even though S ′ is not the same operator as defined in example 2.8 the presence of the formula b = P ∧ (¬P) will also yield that C ′ ({b}, ∅)) ∨ S ′ / ∈ C. Simply substitute S ′ for S with this formula as the b and notice that
Subalgebras
Subalgebras of C, ∧, ∨ w , I, U and C f , ∧, ∨ w , I, U have been studied to a certain extent and appear to be the most appropriate area for further investigation. It is known that there are sublattices of C, ∧, ∨ w , I, U that are atomic and coatomic [1, p. 179 ]. We first show that there are complete and distributive sublattices of C f , ∧, ∨ w , I, U , where ∨ = ∨ w . Moreover, such sublattices need not be atomic. Using the axiomless consequence operators defined in theorem 3.1, we show, in general, that the algebras C and C f do not have the descending chain condition. EXAMPLE 3.2. For infinite L, assume that our general set-theory includes any axiom that implies the Boolean Prime Ideal axiom. Let U be a free ultrafilter on L and let x ∈ L. Then there exists some nonempty U ∈ U such that x / ∈ U since ∩ U = ∅ and ∅ / ∈ U. Letting B = {x}, it follows that I = C(U, B). In order to show that C does not have the descending chain condition, we show that C f does not have this condition. We know that there, at the least, exists a sequence of distinct
Thus the descending chain condition does not hold. Observe that depending upon the type of ultrafilter U used such an infinite chain can have a cardinality greater than ℵ 0 . This completes the example.
Since C, ∧, ∨ w , I, U contains distributive and complete sublattices that are not chains, where ∨ = ∨ w , then a natural question to ask is whether or not such sublattices can have nay other Boolean types structures?
PROOF. Let C, C 1 ∈ C, and I < = C < = C 1 . The C ′ is a relative complement for C iff C ∨ C ′ = C 1 and C ∧ C ′ = I iff for each A ∈ P(L), PROOF. Let C, C ′ ∈ A and assume that A is a chain in C, ≤ . Suppose that C ≤ C ′ . Then for each B ∈ P(L),
Conversely, let C, C ′ ∈ A and C ′ C = C ′ . Then for each B ∈ P(L), C(B) ⊂ C ′ (C(B)) = (C ′ C)(B) = C ′ (B). Thus C ≤ C ′ . In like manner, if CC ′ = C, then C ′ ≤ C and this completes the proof.
In the next section, our attention is often restricted to chains in C f , ≤ . We first embed C, ≤ into a non-standard structure and investigate nonstandard bounds for various chains.
Nonstandard Consequence Operators
Let A be a nonempty finite set of symbols. It is often convenient to assume that A contains a symbol that represents a blank space. As usual any nonempty finite string of symbols from A, with repetitions, is called a word [8, p.222]. A word is also said to be an (intuitive) readable sentence [4, p. 1]. We let W be the intuitive set of all words created from the alphabet A. Note that in distinction to the usual approach, W does not contain a symbol for the empty word.
We accept the concept delineated by Markov [3] , the so-called "abstraction of identity," and say that w 1 , w 2 ∈ W are "equal" if they are composed of the same symbols written in the same intuitive order (left to right). The join or juxtaposition operator between w 1 , w 2 ∈ W is the concept that yields the string w 1 w 2 or w 2 w 1 . Thus W is closed under join. Notice that we may consider a denumerable formal language as a subset of W.
Since W is denumerable, then there exists an injection i: W → IN, where IN is the set of natural numbers with zero. Obviously, if we are working with a formal language that is a subset of W, then we may require i restricted to a formal language to be a Gödel numbering. Due to the join operator, a fixed member of W that contains two or more distinct symbols can be represented by various subwords that are joined together to yield the given fixed word. The word "mathematics" is generated by the join of w 1 = math, w 2 = e, w 3 = mat, w 4 = ics. This word can also be formed by joining together 11 not necessarily distinct members of W.
Let i[W] = T and for each n ∈ IN, let T n = T [0,n] denote the set of all mappings from [0, n] into T. Each element of T n is called a partial sequence, even though this definition is a slight restriction of the usual one that appears in the literature. Let f ∈ T n , n > 0. Then the order induced by f is the simple inverse order determined by f applied to the simple order on [0, n]. Formally, for each
where ≤ is the simple order for IN restricted to [0, n]. In general, we will not use this notation ≤ f but rather we will indicate this (finite) order in the usual acceptable manner by writing the symbols f (n), f (n − 1), . . . , f (0) from left to right .
Let f ∈ t n . Define w f ∈ W as follows: w f = (i −1 (f (n)))(i −1 (f (n − 1))) · · · (i −1 (f (0))), where the operator indicated by juxtaposition is the join. We now define a relation on P = ∪{T n | n ∈ IN} as follows: let f, g ∈ P. Then for f ∈ T n and g ∈ T m , define f ∼ g iff (i −1 (f (n))) · · · (i −1 f (0))) = (i −1 (g(m))) · · · (i −1 (g(0))). It is obvious that ∼ is an equivalence relation on P. For each f ∈ P, [f ] denotes the equivalence class under ∼ that contains f.
and if there exists some k ∈ IN such that 0 < k < m, then there exists some g k ∈ [f ] such that g k ∈ T k and if j ∈ IN and j > m, then there does not exist g j ∈ T j such that g j ∈ [f ]. If we define the size of a word w ∈ W (size(w)) to be the number of not necessarily distinct symbols counting left to right that appear in W, then the size(w) = m + 1. For each w ∈ W, there is f 0 ∈ T 0 such that w = i −1 (f 0 (0)) and such an f m ∈ [f 0 ] such that size (w) = m + 1. On the other hand, given f ∈ P, then there is a g 0 ∈ [f ] such that (i −1 (g 0 (0))) ∈ W. Of course, each g ∈ [f ] is interpreted to be the word (i −1 (g(k))) . . . (i −1 (g(0))).
Each [f ] ∈ E is said to be a (formal) word or (formal) readable sentence. All the intuitive concepts, definitions and results relative to consequence operators defined for A ∈ P(W) are now passed to P(E) by means of the quotient map θ generated by the equivalence relation ∼ . In the usual manner, the quotient map is extended to subsets of each A ∈ P(W), n-ary relations and the like. For example, let w ∈ A ∈ P(w). Then there exists f w ∈ P such that f w ∈ T 0 and f w (0) = i(w). Then θ(i(w)) = [f w ]. In order to simplify notation, the images of the extended (θ i) composition will often be indicated by bold notation with the exception of customary relation symbols which will be understood relative to the context. Let C ∈ H map a family of sets B into B 0 . If C satisfies either the Tarski axioms (i), (ii) or (i), (iii), or the *-transfer *(i), *(ii), or *(i), *(iii) of these axioms, then C is called a subtle consequence operator. For example, if C ∈ C, then it is immediate that * C: * (P(θ(A)) → * P(θ(A))) satisfies *(i) and *(ii) for the family of all internal subsets of * (θ(A) ). This * C is a subtle consequence operator. For any set A ∈ N , let σ A = { * a | a ∈ A}. (In general, this definition does not correspond to that used by other authors.) If for a subtle consequence operator C there does not exist some similarly defined D ∈ N such that C = σ D or C = * D, then C is called a purely subtle consequence operator. Let infinite A ⊂ E and B = * A − σ A. Then the identity I: P(B) − P(B) is a purely subtle consequence operator.
There are certain technical procedures associated with the σ map that take on a specific significance for consequence operators. Recall that N is closed under finitely many power set or finite power set iterations. Let X, Y ∈ N . It is not difficult to show that if P: P(X) → Y, then for each A ∈ P(X), * (P(A)) = * P( * A). Moreover, if F : P(X) → Y, where F is the finite power set operator, then for each A ∈ P(A), * (F (A)) = * F ( * A). If C ∈ C and X ⊂ E, then C: P(X) → P(X) has the property that for each A ∈ P(X), * (C(A)) = * C( * A).
Recall that we identify each * n ∈ * IN with n ∈ IN since * n is but a constant sequence with the value n. Utilizing this fact, we have the following straightforward lemma the proof of which is omitted. F ∈ F (B) , then σ (C(F )) ⊂ ( σ C)( σ F ) = ( σ C)(F ). Also, σ (C(B)) ⊂ σ C( * B) and in general σ (C(B)) = ( σ C)( * B), σ (C(F )) = ( σ C)(F ).
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we remove from C the one and only one inconsistent consequence operator U. Thus notationally we let C denote the set of all consequence operators defined on infinite L ⊂ W with the exception of U. Two types of chains will be investigated. Let T be any chain in C, ≤ and T ′ be any chain with the additional property that for each C ∈ T ′ there exists some C ′ ∈ T ′ such that C < C ′ . THEOREM 4.2 There exists some C 0 ∈ * T such that for each C ∈ T, * C ≤ C 0 . There exists some C ′ 0 ∈ * T ′ such that C ′ 0 is a purely subtle consequence operator and for each C ∈ T ′ , * C < C ′ 0 . Each member of * T and * T ′ are subtle consequence operators.
PROOF. Let R = {(x, y) | x, y ∈ T} and x ≤ y} and R ′ {(x, y) | x, y ∈ T ′ and x < y}. In the usual manner, it follows that R and R ′ are concurrent on the set T and T ′ respectively. Thus there is some C 0 ∈ * T and C ′ 0 ∈ * T ′ such that for each C ∈ T and C ′ ∈ T, * C ≤ C 0 and * C ′ < C ′ 0 since * M is an enlargement. Note that the members of * T and * T ′ are defined on the set of all internal subsets of * L. However, if there is some similarly defined D ∈ N such that C 0 or C ′ 0 = σ D, then since σ D is only defined for *-extensions of the (standard) members of P(L) and each E ∈ * T or * T ′ is defined on the internal subsets of * L and there are internal subsets of * L that are not *-extensions of standard sets we would have a contradiction. Of course, each member of * T or * T ′ is a subtle consequence operator. Hence each E ∈ * T or * T ′ is either equal to some * C, where C ∈ T or C ∈ T ′ or it is a purely subtle consequence operator. Now there does not exist a D ∈ N such that
0 is a purely subtle consequence operator. This completes the proof.
Let C ∈ T ′ . Since * C < C ′ 0 , then C ′ 0 is "more powerful" than any C ∈ T ′ in the following sense. If B ∈ P(L), then for each C ∈ T ′ it follows that C(B) ⊂ * (C(B)) = * C( * B) ⊂ C ′ 0 ( * B). Recall that, for C ∈ C, a set B ∈ P(L) is called a C-deductive system if C(B) = B. From this point on, all results are restricted to chains in C f , ≤ . By axiom (iii), the domain of Q is C(B). Let (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n ) ∈ Q. By theorem 1 in [5, p. 64 ], (the monotone theorem) we have that C(y 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ C(y n ) ⊂ C(y 1 ∪ · · · ∪ y n ). Since F = y 1 ∪ · · · ∪ y n ∈ F (B), then (x 1 , F ), . . . , (x n , F ) ∈ Q. Thus Q is concurrent on C(B). Hence there exists some F 0 ∈ * (F (B) ) such that σ (C(B) (i) There exists a *-finite F B ∈ * (F (B) ) and a subtle consequence operator C B ∈ * T such that for all C ∈ T, σ (C(B)) = C(B) ⊂ C B (F B ).
(ii) There exists a *-finite F B ∈ * (F (B) ) and a purely subtle consequence operator
, and x(w) ⊂ y(w)}. Let {((x 1 , z 1 ), (y 1 , w 1 )), . . . , ((x n , z n ), (y n , w n ))} ⊂ Q. Notice that F = w 1 ∪ · · · ∪ w n ∈ F (B) and for the set K = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, let D be the largest member of K with respect to ≤ . It follows that z i ∈ x i (w i ) ⊂ x i (F ) ⊂ D(F ) for each i = 1, . . . , n. Hence {((x 1 , z 1 ), (D, F )), . . . , ((x n , z n ), (D, F ))} ⊂ Q implies that Q is concurrent on its domain. Consequently, there exists some (C B , F B ) ∈ * T × * (F (B) ) such that for each (
. This all implies that for each C ∈ T, σ (C(B)) = C(B) ⊂ C B (F B ).
(ii) Change the relation Q to Q ′ by requiring that x = y. Replace D in the proof of (i) above with D ′ is greater than and not equal to the largest member of K. Such a D ′ exists in T ′ from the definition of T ′ . Continue the proof in the same manner in order to obtain C ′ B and F ′ B . The fact that C ′ B is a purely subtle consequence operator follows in the same manner as in the proof of theorem 4.2. The nonstandard results in this section have important applications to mathematical philosophy. We present two such applications. Let F be the symbolic alphabet for any formal language L with the usual assortment of primitive symbols [8, p. 59] . We note that it is possible to mimic the construction of L within E itself. If this is done, then it is not necessary to consider the intuitive map θ and we may restrict our attention entirely to the sets E and * E. Let S denote the predicate consequence operator by the standard rules for predicate (prooftheory) deduction as they appear on pages 59 and 60 of reference [8] . Hence A ∈ P(L), S(A) = {x | x ∈ L and A ⊢ x}. It is not difficult to restrict the modus ponens rule of inference in such a manner that a denumerable set T ′ = {C n | n ∈ IN} of consequence operators defined on P(L) is generated with the following properties. Let L be a first-order language and A ∈ P(L). Then there exists a purely subtle C 1 ∈ * T ′ and a *-finite F 1 ∈ * (F (A)) such that for each B ∈ P(A) and each C ∈ T ′ (i) C(B) ⊂ C 1 (F 1 ), (ii) S(B) ⊂ C 1 (F 1 ) ⊂ * S(F 1 ) ⊂ * (S(A)).
(iii) * S(F 1 ) ∩ L = S(A) = C 1 (F 1 ) ∩ L.
PROOF. The same proof as for corollary 4.4.1 yields that there is some purely subtle C 1 ∈ * T ′ and F 1 ∈ * (F (A)) such that for each B ∈ P(A) and each C ∈ T ′ , C(B) ⊂ C 1 (F 1 ) and (i) follows. From (i), it follows that { σ (C(B)) | C ∈ T ′ } = {C(B) | C ∈ T ′ } = S(B) = σ (S(B)) ⊂ C 1 (F 1 ) and the first part of (ii) holds. By *-transfer C 1 < * S and C 1 and * S are defined on internal subsets of * A. Thus C 1 (F 1 ) ⊂ * S(F 1 ) ⊂ * S( * A) = * (S(A)) by the *-monotone property. This completes (ii). Since S(A) ⊂ C 1 (F 1 ) ⊂ * S(F 1 ) ⊂ * (S(A)) from (ii), then (iii) follows and the theorem is proved. REMARK 4.6. Of course, it is well known that there exists some F ∈ * (F (A)) such that S(A) ⊃ A ⊂ F ⊂ * A and *-transfer of axiom (i) yields that * S(F ) ⊂ * S( * A) = * (S(A)). However, F 1 of theorem 4.5 is of a special nature in that the purely subtle C 1 applied to F 1 yields the indicated properties. Also theorem 4.5 holds for many other infinite languages and deductive processes.
Let L be a language and let M be a structure in which L can be interpreted in the usual manner. A consequence operator C is sound for M if whenever A ∈ P(L) has the property that M |= A, then M |= C(A). As usual, T (M ) = {x | x ∈ L and M |= x}. Obviously, if C is sound for M , then T (M ) is a C-deductive system. Notice that the fact that F 0 is *-finite implies that F 0 is *-recursive. Moreover, trivially, F 0 is a *-axiom system for * C(F 0 ), and we do not lack knowledge about the behavior of F 0 since any formal property about C or recursive sets, among others, must hold for * C or F 0 when property interpreted. If L is a first-order language, then S is sound for first-order structures. Theorem 4.5 not only yields a *-finite F 1 but a purely subtle consequence operator C 1 such that, trivially, F 1 is a *-axiom for C 1 (F 1 ) and for * S(F 1 ). In this case, we have that * S(F 1 )∩L = T (M ) = C 1 (F 1 )∩L. By the use of internal and external objects, the nonstandard logics { * C, * L}, {C 1 , * L} and { * S, * L} technically by-pass a portion of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
By definition b ∈ S(B), B ∈ P(L) iff there is a finite length "proof" of b from the premises B. It follows, that for each b ∈ * (T (M )) there exists a *-finite length proof of b from a *-finite set of premises F 1 . If we let * M be an enlargement with the ℵ 1 -isomorphism property, among others, then each *-finite length proof is either externally finite or externally infinite, and all externally infinite proof lengths are of the same external cardinality [3] .
